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Evolution and Culture
Abstract
The goal of cross-cultural psychology to identify and explain similarities and differences in
the behavior of individuals in different cultures requires linking human behavior to its context
(Cole, Meshcheryakov & Ponomariov, 2011). In order to specify this relation, the focus is
usually on the sociocultural environment and how it interacts with behavior. Since cross-
cultural psychology also deals with the evolutionary and biological bases of behavior, this
focus on culture has regularly led to an unbalanced view (Berry, Poortinga, Breugelmans,
Chasiotis & Sam, 2011). Too often, biology and culture are seen as opposites: what is
labeled as cultural is not biological and what is labeled as biological is not cultural (Chasiotis,
2010, 2011a). This article will first introduce the central concepts of natural and sexual
selection, adaptation, and the epigenetic (open) genetic processes in evolutionary biology,
and indicate their psychological implications. It will then argue that biology and culture are
intricately related. Finally, empirical evidence from diverse psychological research areas
will be presented to illustrate why the study of the evolutionary basis is as essential as
the analysis of the sociocultural context for the understanding of behavior. Due to space
restrictions, cultural transmission will be the only research area which is addressed in more
detail (more examples of evolutionary approaches in intelligence, personality, and behavior
genetics and their implications for cross-cultural research can be found on the website
accompanying Berry et al., 2011; see also further readings section).
This article is available in Online Readings in Psychology and Culture: http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/orpc/vol9/iss1/1
The goal of cross-cultural psychology to identify and explain similarities and differences in 
the behavior of individuals in different cultures requires linking human behavior to its 
context (Cole, Meshcheryakov & Ponomariov, 2011). In order to specify this relation, the 
focus is usually on the sociocultural environment and how it interacts with behavior. Since 
cross-cultural psychology also deals with the evolutionary and biological bases of 
behavior, this focus on culture has regularly led to an unbalanced view (Berry, Poortinga, 
Breugelmans, Chasiotis & Sam, 2011). Too often, biology and culture are seen as 
opposites: what is labeled as cultural is not biological and what is labeled as biological is 
not cultural (Chasiotis, 2010, 2011a). This article will first introduce the central concepts of 
natural and sexual selection, adaptation, and the epigenetic (open) genetic processes in 
evolutionary biology, and indicate their psychological implications. It will then argue that 
biology and culture are intricately related. Finally, empirical evidence from diverse 
psychological research areas will be presented to illustrate why the study of the 
evolutionary basis is as essential as the analysis of the sociocultural context for the 
understanding of behavior. Due to space restrictions, cultural transmission will be the only 
research area which is addressed in more detail (more examples of evolutionary 
approaches in intelligence, personality, and behavior genetics and their implications for 
cross-cultural research can be found on the website accompanying Berry et al., 2011; see 
also further readings section).  
Basic concepts of evolutionary biology 
Natural selection  
The theory of natural selection, formulated originally by Charles Darwin in the nineteenth 
century (1859) and further developed in the course of over 150 years, is central to the 
biological sciences. For some scholars it is even the single most influential scientific theory 
of all (Dawkins, 1976, Dennett, 1995, Trivers, 1985). In short, the evolutionary process of 
natural selection can be described in three steps: reproduction, variance and selection 
(Dennett, 1995). These processes serve to achieve the ultimate goal of evolution, namely 
the dispersion of genes via a) reproduction, which leads to b) random genetic variations in 
the progeny; these new variants are then subject to c) selective environmental forces. 
Darwin wanted to understand how new species occur; his view was that natural 
selection acted on the individual level: By gradually sorting out non-adaptive individual 
traits, individuals with less adaptive traits left less and less descendants until these traits 
were no longer part of the genetic repertoire of the species at all (Dennett, 1995; Mayr, 
1984). However, his theory was interpreted as if individuals were trying to preserve their 
species by procreating. The most important landmark of modern evolutionary theorizing is 
the transformation of this idea of preservation of the species through individual 
reproduction (or Darwinian fitness) to the conception of inclusive fitness (Hamilton, 1964). 
Inclusive fitness is the sum of the individual fitness outcomes resulting from an individual’s 
own procreation (Darwinian fitness) and the procreation of relatives with whom the 
individual shares genes. The focus on the concept of inclusive fitness implies that the unit 
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of natural selection is the gene (Dawkins, 1976), although it is not the gene per se that is 
exposed to selective forces directly but the individual organism that lives or dies, breeds or 
helps the relatives (Daly & Wilson, 1983). This shift from the species to the individual level 
has substantial implications for the conception of human nature. It implies that altruism, the 
prosocial orientation and behavior, is not an unconditional human trait, but results from 
cost-benefit considerations, even if these are implicit and unconscious. There are two main 
concepts to describe the evolution of cooperative social behavior in self-interested 
organisms via natural selection: kin selection (Hamilton, 1964) and reciprocal altruism 
(Trivers, 1971). 
Kin selection. According to this conception, individuals’ social behaviors will vary 
according to the degree of genetic relatedness among group members. Individuals will be 
more cooperative with closely related others as compared to more distantly related or non-
related others. The underlying assumption is that genetic closeness fosters cooperation 
and the reciprocation of investments. Cooperation and altruism based on the perception of 
reciprocity is considered as Hamilton’s rule (Hamilton, 1964). Considerable empirical 
evidence has been presented in supporting this assumption. Dunbar and Spoors (1995) 
found that in Great Britain adults nominate a high proportion of kin relative to non-kin for 
help and support (see also Burnstein, Crandall, & Kitayama, 1994). In the same vein, 
Fijneman and colleagues (1996) reported that the family has been identified as the most 
salient ingroup in the lives of individuals (see also Neyer & Lang, 2003). As a final 
example, Georgas, Berry, van de Vijver, Kağitçibaşi and Poortinga (2006) concluded 
based on findings from an extensive cross-cultural research program, that relationships 
among family members are the most significant relationships in literally all parts of the 
world. 
Reciprocal altruism. The concept of reciprocal altruism has been proposed by 
Trivers (1971) in order to capture social relations among genetically unrelated individuals. 
It predicts that individuals will cooperate with those with whom there is likely to be future 
social exchange and the expectation, implicit or explicit, that the costs of cooperative and 
altruistic behaviors that an individual invests are to be reciprocated in the future. It is 
assumed that these expectations are based on prior experiences of cooperative 
interactions. Cross-cultural field studies (Kaniasty & Norris, 1995) have found that a caring 
non-relative would be more likely to benefit from someone’s altruism than a neglectful non-
relative would be. 
Sexual selection 
About a decade after the publication of his theory of natural selection (1859), Darwin 
postulated a second selection process, namely sexual selection (Darwin, 1871). While 
natural selection deals with traits related to the struggle of survival and maintenance (e.g. 
food acquisition and hygiene), sexual selection acts upon all traits which are related to 
mating and sexual reproduction. Sexual selection is based on two processes, intrasexual 
competition and intersexual mate selection (Voland & Grammer, 2003). It took more than a 
century before Trivers (1972) recognized the implications of Darwin’s theory to explain 
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animal and human behavior. Trivers (1972, p. 140) argued that in sexually reproducing 
species like humans  
“…the sex whose typical parental investment is greater than that of the opposite 
sex will become the limiting resource for that sex. Individuals of the sex investing 
less will compete among themselves to breed with members of the sex investing 
more.”  
In mammals, this limiting sex is the female and thus leads to higher intrasexual 
competition within the male sex (Daly & Wilson, 1983, 1988). This concept of sex 
differences in parental investment explains motivational differences and can help to 
answer the question why men and women often do not want to act in a similar way, 
although they are in principle able to do so (see Berry et al., 2011, pp. 45-49 for cross-
cultural examples).  
 
The handicap principle or the costly signaling theory. Costly signaling theory argues 
that many seemingly useless or harmful traits (handicaps), like the peacocks tail, evolved 
just because they signal their expensiveness and thus the high fitness quality of the bearer 
of this trait (Zahavi, 1975). For many decades, this handicap principle was criticized as 
being implausible: how can an apparently non-adaptive, costly trait still be beneficial for 
the bearer’s fitness? After numerous empirical verifications in the animal kingdom, first 
mainly in birds (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997), it has been rediscovered and finally also applied 
to humans. It also has been at the basis of evolutionary hypotheses on complex 
psychological domains like religion (Voland & Schiefenhövel, 2009), music, art, language, 
morality or altruism (Miller, 2000; Voland & Grammer, 2003). For example, from the 
perspective of the costly signaling theory, religious commitments might have been 
selected for the very reason that they are costly, (i. e., they are signals which are not easy 
to fake); through circumcision, through donations of large amounts of money, through 
observing rigid rules of dress or everyday behavior, adherents signal to the religious 
community that they are true and ardent believers. Thus, individuals profit from belonging 
to this special group, while the group profits by enhancing intragroup cooperation. Sosis 
and Bressler (2003), for example, using historical data on the constraints and ritual 
requirements of eighty-three nineteen-century communes in the USA could show that 
communes that imposed costlier requirements survived longer than less demanding 
communities. 
Let’s take human cooperation as another example. The conceptualization of 
reciprocal altruism as proposed by Trivers (1971) was restricted to two-person interactions 
and is thus at most applicable to small and stable groups typical for hunter-gatherer 
societies (Kaplan, Hill, Lancaster, & Hurtado, 2000). Modern large scale societies are 
characterized by multiple and often anonymous interactions with unfamiliar and, 
consequently, unpredictable partners: If future benefits or reciprocity are uncertain, why 
should one behave altruistically in the first place? During the last decade, two theoretical 
concepts were introduced to enhance the understanding of human cooperation: altruistic 
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rewarding and altruistic punishment (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). Altruistic rewarding is the 
cross-culturally observed trustful exchange that has been widely documented in economic 
experiments based on game theoretical assumptions. Altruistic punishment, also a cross-
culturally robust result, is the costly rejection of social imbalance, like for example unfair 
sharing (Henrich, 2001; Henrich et al., 2005). However, even the combination of altruistic 
rewarding and punishment is often not sufficient to explain social engagement in public or 
common goods’ situations involving larger groups with potentially anonymous interactions. 
Human conditional cooperation is based on implicit assumptions whether all or most group 
members will cooperate or not. This assumption in turn is mainly determined by the 
possibility of punishment by third parties (Fischbacher, Gächter, & Fehr, 2001). So even 
more important than altruistic punishment in dyadic interactions is the altruistic propensity 
to punish norm violators by third parties who are not economically affected (Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2004). This is regarded to be a key element of the enforcement of social 
norms in human societies (Hill, 2002). Reputation through indirect reciprocity or social 
reputation (Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002) constitutes another powerful 
mechanism for the enforcement of cooperation. Reputation forming behavior can, for 
example, consist of tough bargaining with insisting on a fair exchange combined with the 
readiness to pay a costly price to punish deceivers (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003).  
From an evolutionary perspective, this kind of cooperation can be easily subsumed 
under the “costly signal” or “handicap principle” (Zahavi, 1975), because this mechanism 
explains why we show costly signals, i.e. behave altruistically, although we might not gain 
anything, even not indirectly. The underlying assumption is that individuals can afford to 
show off because they have as a consequence a higher reputation and thus a higher 
genetic fitness which lowers the costs of showing a particular behavior or trait (Voland & 
Grammer, 2003).  
How and why questions:  
Adaptation and the distinction of proximate and distal causes 
The distinction of proximate and distal (or ultimate) causes helps to describe psychological 
phenomena like emotions, cognitions, and motivations which lead to a certain behavior 
(the proximate how question). But they also help to explain why these phenomena became 
the way they are (the ultimate why question). In cross-cultural psychology, their function 
usually refers to a psychological striving to obtain some kind of affective or cognitive state 
of equilibrium or well-being, thereby implying that the ultimate function of our psychological 
strivings is to survive and live a happy life. From an evolutionary perspective, this is only 
half of the story, explaining only the psychological, proximate causes of a behavior (e.g., 
by trying to show how we pursue a happy life). But why do we strive to obtain one certain 
state of mind and not another? Why do some things, like having children (and 
grandchildren, see Voland, Chasiotis & Schiefenhövel, 2005), make us happy while others 
do not? These are complementary questions dealing with the distal or ultimate cause of 
our psychological makeup. From an evolutionary perspective, a psychology based on the 
ultimate goal of survival or well-being is incomplete. Just by considering the fact that life is 
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finite, it becomes obvious that organisms did not evolve merely to survive and live a happy 
and carefree life, but ultimately, to reproduce. 
To understand how and why individual traits fit to environmental conditions, the 
Darwinian concept of adaptation is crucial. Adaptation usually refers to any process in 
which an organism reacts to demands of the environment in a way which enhances its 
well-being, survival, or its reproduction (for discussions, see Berry et al., 2011; Chasiotis, 
2010). It is important to distinguish between the proximal, psychological adaptation and the 
evolutionary, distal adaptation. In evolutionary biology, the term refers to the adjustment of 
a population to an environment: Biological adaptations carry environmental information 
that has become represented in phenotypes during evolution because it helped organisms 
to (survive in order to) reproduce. Each species occupies an ecological niche in the 
environment. This niche is defined by the way of life of the individual organisms. It can be 
said that an organism contributes to establishing its own ecological niche through the way 
it interacts with the environment (Odling-Smee, Laland, & Feldman, 2003). From this 
perspective adaptation is the process of keeping up with the changing environment, which 
in turn is not organism-independent, because the organism defines the environmental 
features which can act upon it (Chasiotis, 2010).  
With the Darwinian concept of adaptation, evolutionary theorizing integrates 
biological and cultural forces in a common framework and offers heuristically fruitful 
implications for evolutionary-based research in cross-cultural psychology (see Chasiotis, 
2011a, 2011b). Because an evolutionary-oriented psychology hypothesizes human 
species-typical psychological adaptations, evolutionary approaches in cross-cultural 
psychology are concerned with universals in their broad sense: Universals, then, are 
psychological features (such as mechanisms, concepts, and processes) which are 
functionally organized to use cross-cultural regularities in the social and non-social 
environment and give rise to panhuman mental structures and contents. These 
mechanisms constitute the human metaculture (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; see the 
impressive catalogue of these features of the Universal People by Brown, 1991). That is 
also the reason why it is not very surprising from an evolutionary point of view that findings 
from meta-analytic approaches in cross-cultural psychology show that human psychology 
is far more homogenous than some relativists might expect. Culture-comparative studies 
on such diverse psychological domains like emotions, personality, family relations (Van 
Hemert, 2003, 2011), generativity (Hofer, Busch, Chasiotis, Kaertner & Campos, 2008) or 
well-being (Hofer & Chasiotis, 2003; Hofer, Chasiotis & Campos, 2006) show that cross-
cultural psychological differences are mostly smaller than they appear at face value once 
methodological artefacts and socioeconomic contextual factors are considered (see Berry 
et al., 2011 for a more thorough discussion of this shift from an interest in variations in the 
expression of behavior across cultures to the similarity in the underlying common 
psychological processes and capacities).  
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Development and the epigenetic view: The concept of open genetic programs 
A telling example why a dichotomy between biology and culture does not apply is the 
epigenetic nature of human development (Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 2002; Gottlieb, 1998;). 
The epigenetic relationship of genes and environment can best be described by 
introducing the concept of open genetic programs. Genes exert their effects on behavior 
within two kinds of programs that can be differentiated with respect to the directness of the 
gene-behavior relationship. Fixed genetic programs are invariably coded in the DNA of the 
genotype and expressed in phenotypic characteristics without further transmission 
mechanisms. Besides the action of fixed behavioral programs, behavior and behavioral 
development of higher animals and especially humans is organized to a great extent by 
open genetic programs that are more susceptible to current environmental input (Mayr, 
1997; Chasiotis, 2010). Contrary to the common misunderstanding of evolutionary biology 
as fully deterministic, the epigenetic view of development is bidirectional: if a gene is 
switched on, its genetic activity is a cause for the development of an organism, but the 
expression of the involved genes during ontogenesis is also influenced by the ontogenetic 
experiences of the individual (Gottlieb, 1998). Taking this perspective, the goals of cross-
cultural psychology cannot be reached without examining development, because 
behavioral differences in the adult phenotype across cultures are the result of epigenetic 
processes during development (Keller, 2007, 2011).  
Open genetic programs influence and direct behavior in manifold ways. They are 
products of evolutionary fixed programs but constitute “facultative” or “open” 
developmental processes (Odling-Smee et al., 2003). For language acquisition, for 
example, a different interplay between genetic preparedness and learning might be 
operating than for motor development or social competencies. Learning based on these 
open genetic programs therefore has to be understood as a highly specialized mechanism 
for the acquisition of specific environmental information at certain phases of development 
(Trivers, 1985; see also the concepts of “epigenetic rules”, Wilson, 1975; “central 
tendencies”, MacDonald, 1988; “Darwinian algorithms”, Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; and 
“informed hypotheses”, Chisholm, 1999). The expression of the genetic information in 
behavior can also occur during different stages of the human life span and can even 
become stronger with development (see for example the onset and offset of reproductive 
capability, Voland et al., 2005). The open or closed nature of these predispositions varies 
according to the required specificity of the environmental information (see e.g., the 
ethological concept of a sensitive period for imprinting, Lorenz, 1965).  
One of the most obvious manifestations of the interplay between open and fixed 
genetic programs is the evolution of life spans (Chasiotis, 2010, 2011a; Keller, 2011). 
Because ontogenetic plasticity is also genetically based, the question is not “Which 
ontogenetic processes are genetically determined and which are not?” Rather, the 
evolutionarily significant question is “Why is there an ontogenesis based on epigenetic 
processes and not an adult phenotype right away?” This view implies that different 
developmental stages are not transitory phases toward adulthood but evolutionary end-
products per se (Alexander, 1987; Bjorklund, 1997).  
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There are two kinds of evolutionary functions for developmental stages: Firstly, they 
can be ontogenetic adaptations, i.e. that many features of childhood are either only 
functional during particular phases in development (e.g. Meltzoff & Moore, 1977), or they 
can be seen as a sort of adaptive immaturity (see e. g. the overestimation of competences 
during the preschool period as an adaptive function for persisting in young children, 
Bjorklund, 1997).  
The second function is that some other features of childhood can be considered 
preparations for adulthood. If environmental change is slow compared to an individual 
lifespan, the optimal mode of adaptation is to establish sensitive learning situations early in 
life as preparations for adulthood that guide later development (Chasiotis, 2011a; Draper & 
Harpending, 1988). This evolutionary perspective fits with empirical evidence in the 
psychological literature and in mainstream developmental psychology, in which the first six 
years of childhood are considered as psychologically the most important (“functional”) for 
individual development (Lamb & Sutton-Smith, 1982). Every child is reared in a unique 
environment characterized by contextual variables like number of siblings, specific birth 
order position (Sulloway, 1996; Tolman, 1971), and socioeconomic conditions. Evidence 
for the importance of socioeconomic factors for developmental conditions comes also from 
extensive value surveys in sociology (Inglehart, 1997) and cross-cultural psychology (Allen 
et al., 2007): The financial situation during childhood has been found to be a better 
predictor of the endorsement of values in adulthood than the current economic situation of 
the adult respondent. Recent empirical evidence for these two building blocks of childhood 
context, birth order and socioeconomic status during childhood, demonstrate their 
explanatory power for cultural variance in such highly diverse areas as pubertal timing 
(Chasiotis, Keller & Scheffer, 2003), parenting motivation (Chasiotis, Hofer & Campos, 
2006; Chasiotis, Bender & Hofer, 2011), social values, and autobiographical memory 
(Bender & Chasiotis, 2010).  
These results imply that the family context during childhood can be a powerful tool to 
explain cross-cultural differences in developmental outcomes. Therefore, context variables 
like socioeconomic status during childhood, birth order or number of siblings can be 
expected to exert similar influences on somatic, psychological, and reproductive 
developmental trajectories across different cultural contexts. On the basis of the 
explanatory power of these childhood context variables for cultural differences, it can be 
suggested that many psychological characteristics that are typically attributed to cultural 
differences may reflect systematic variations in family constellations across cultural 
contexts (for further implications, see Chasiotis, 2011a).  
Cultural Transmission 
Genetic information is transmitted from generation to generation. However, the 
psychological transmission of information between members of a cultural group in the 
course of ontogenetic development does not necessarily require a genetic relationship. 
One of the most important tasks in Human Behavioral Sciences is explaining how social or 
cultural information is transmitted, both inter- (e.g., via parents) and intragenerationally 
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(e.g., via peers). In the Social Sciences, more traditional concepts describing this 
transmission process (like socialization and internalization, Berry et al., 2011) seem to 
have been replaced in the meantime by more modern ones like enculturation, cultural 
learning, and cultural transmission (Berry et al., 2011; Schönpflug, 2009). Still, there is an 
ongoing and fruitful debate about why (function) what (content) is sent in which way 
(mode) by whom (sender) during cultural transmission. When following the classical 
definition of Cavalli-Sforza, Feldman, Chen, and Dornbusch (1982) that “cultural 
transmission is the process of acquisition of behaviors, attitudes or technologies through 
imprinting, conditioning, imitation, active teaching, and learning or a combination of these” 
(p. 19), cultural transmission can then be regarded as either opposed to, or 
complementary to, genetic or biological transmission. However, the relationship between 
biological and cultural transmission is still not very clear. There are at least three different 
ways to describe their relationship: First, there is the classical, but outdated notion in the 
Social Sciences of cultural transmission as being opposed to genetic transmission (nature-
nurture antinomy; see Chasiotis, 2011 for discussion). Second, Dawkins’ conceptualized 
the “meme” (1976) as a basic information unit that is an analogous, but independent 
counterpart to the biological notion of a gene. The meme may be a somewhat hapless 
concept, because it was not intended to be regarded as such a counterpart to the genetic 
process of transmission (Dawkins, 1982) while at the same time being hard to tackle 
empirically. Finally, and arguably the most plausible way, cultural and biological 
transmission can be described as parallel and functionally related (e.g., via epigenetic 
learning, Chasiotis, 2011).  
From an evolutionary perspective, the adaptivity of cultural transmission is signified 
by a higher reproductive success of those individuals who successfully obtain information 
from their cultural environment that helps them (or their kin) to reproduce. An alternative 
view to such an adaptive value of cultural transmission can be found in theories of self-
organization. According to these theories many behavioral patterns, including cultural 
transmission on the group or societal level, do not have to be functional. A similar view can 
be found in the addition of a historical perspective as a function of cultural transmission 
(Cole, 1996). There are also attempts to reconcile both views, in which a synergistic 
relationship between natural selection and self-organizing complexity is favored (e.g., 
Wilson, 2005). Furthermore, the causality of this transmission process on levels higher 
than the individual level is still not clear: Are we dealing with a process executed by the 
individuals themselves and can its outcome therefore be regarded as a dependent 
variable? Or is cultural transmission a phenomenon taking place outside the individual? 
Biologists have developed formal models in which the transmission of both genetic 
and cultural information is dealt with. One well-known example is the dual inheritance 
model of Boyd and Richerson (1985, 2005). They postulate a cultural inheritance system 
that is based on social learning, which is distinguished from individual learning. The latter 
is based on trial-and-error or conditioning principles, which are processes that are 
regarded to be too uneconomic to account for the acquisition of a large cultural repertoire 
(Henrich & McElreath, 2007). Social learning by observation and imitation leads to cultural 
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stability of behavior patterns. Individual learning, shaped by specific environmental 
conditions, leads to change. 
Finally, there are approaches based on the new branch of costly signaling theory 
which tries to explain the evolution of culture. The interpretation of cooperative or altruistic 
acts as costly signaling can explain why we contribute to public goods, but it cannot 
explain why we should "show off" in social contexts through being altruistic and not, for 
example, by trying to appear genetically fit by impressing others how particularly brave, 
powerful, or healthy we are (Voland & Grammer, 2003). In the first section we have 
mentioned evidence of human subjective evaluations of fairness and inequity aversion, i.e. 
the disapproval of unequal transactions. Such behavior goes against the principle of 
economic rationality which would imply self-interested free-riding without any 
considerations of fairness (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). However, cooperative behavior is 
likely to be imitated when everybody cooperates. Thus, in special contextual 
circumstances, like in the human case of cultural transmission through accumulative 
cultural evolution, norms and institutions may have been maintained through altruistic 
punishment by third parties (Bowles, Choi, & Hopfensitz, 2003; Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, & 
Richerson, 2003). This line of reasoning basically conceives of humans as being uniquely 
prone and able to act altruistically. Some authors even start to postulate a species-specific 
"altruistic drive" (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Warneken, Chen & Tomasello, 2006) 
facilitating within-group cooperation in humans. This view has been challenged by a fair 
number of studies showing similar prosocial behaviors in non-primate species (Brosnan, 
Newton-Fischer & van Vugt, 2009). Bshary and colleagues could show in pairwise 
cooperating cleaner fish that they are also able to detect and punish defectors (Bshary, 
Gruter, Willener, & Leimar, 2008; Raihani, Grutter, & Bshary, 2010). This punishment 
promotes cooperation and thereby yields direct foraging benefits to the punisher. The 
authors concluded that third-party punishment can evolve via self-serving tendencies in a 
nonhuman species, and this finding may also shed light on the evolutionary dynamics of 
more complex behavior in other animal species, including humans (Bshary & Bergmüller, 
2008; see Berry et al., 2011 and Chasiotis, 2010, 2011b for further discussion).  
Conclusion 
The available evidence leads to the conclusion that evolutionary approaches can be very 
fruitful for cross-cultural psychology. Such a position means that the pursuit of a 
universalist perspective is more appropriate than a relativist perspective in which typically 
human functions are seen as inherently (and only) cultural (see Berry et al., 2011). It is still 
a common tendency in much cross-cultural psychology to consider “culture” as the 
explanans and not as the explanandum. Evolutionary biology can help to identify variables 
that can explain the emergence of cultural differences by disentangling the oftentimes 
fuzzy conception of culture that dominates many cross-cultural comparisons (for critical 
discussions see van de Vijver, Chasiotis & Breugelmans, 2011). 
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This book provides an illustration of the models that emerge when the role of the 
ecological and sociocultural environment is emphasized more than in traditional 
evolutionary approaches. 
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